Tribal Areas of Pakistan, Afghanistan Interconnectivity And Spillover Effects

1. Introduction

1.1. Afghanistan particularly its area south of Hindukush range and Pakistan’s tribal area, North West Frontier Province and northern portion of Baluchistan, collectively constituting the Pathan majority land lying between the Hindukush range and the Indus river, have remained a focal point not only for historians but also for those trying to extend their imperial borders. These extensions have been either to the south or east as in the case of earlier conquerors from Central Asia and the USSR in recent times or to the west or north as by the Imperial British in the 19th and 20th centuries. Dominant civilisations always expand in search for security, stability of their frontiers and to safeguard their economic and commercial interests. Such great movements are well known in history; they continue until they either overrun their strength as in the case of USSR in Afghanistan, or until they find a formidable wall in the form of an equally stable civilisation, or by reaching a natural frontier such as a great mountain range, desert or the sea.
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Pakistan In Crisis

This Article appeared in Daily Dawn on  July 22nd, 2008.

PAKISTAN is heading towards a political meltdown. It has fallen into a state of non-governance in the face of grave threats to its security. The situation can change if the country reinvents and rediscovers itself miraculously at this eleventh hour. This article is not designed to create despondency but to give an objective assessment of what is happening within the country and outside. An ostrich-like attitude will not really help.

The fact is that Talibanisation is taking over the country rapidly due to the lack of any tangible counter-strategy from the government’s side. The religious extremists are openly challenging the government’s writ every day and personnel of the police, Frontier Constabulary, Frontier Corps and other security agencies are being killed or kidnapped by the dozens. The government appears to be clueless about how to respond to the crisis. The extremists are not considerable in number but through sheer terror tactics they are forcing more and more people into submission. The area under their control is increasing day by day and that under the government’s jurisdiction is shrinking.
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The Role Of Peace And Democracy In Fata

This speech was delivered at a workshop in Area Studies Centre, Peshawar on 12th March 2008.

Mr Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen the topic for this Workshop i.e The role of peace and democracy in FATA is an interesting and well thought out subject under the present environments. The ill thought out invasion of Afghanistan by the forces of erstwhile USSR in 1979 pushed this region into a phase of destabilization which is still continuing. Pakistan after suffering some setbacks initially remained largely stabilized. However with the complex situation now developing in Afghanistan the fall out into Pakistan is far greater than in any previous situations. The threat of Extremism and Terrorism beside its Worldwide Effects has started threatening the State of Pakistan. Since the first fall out effects from situation in Afghanistan are felt in FATA because of its Geographic contiguity with that country therefore discussion of Subject of this Workshop is indeed a very pertinent enterprise and we should all be very grateful to Peshawar Area Study Centre for having arranged this Workshop and for having selected this subject.

 In order to have useful discussion one could follow any methodology according to ones understanding of the problem. The one I have followed is as shown:-
·       Analysis of the Role of Peace and Democracy in FATA
·       The Present Setup in FATA
·       Desirability and Achievability of  the Objective
·       The Way Forward
 Analysis of Role of Peace and Democracy in FATA

FATA is a unique area with a unique system of administration wound around local customs and traditions. They have seen many large armies passing through their areas and they have stood for their traditions and have never been over awed by these super powers passing through their areas. They have always engaged these powers both in combat and negotiations. Pakistan and for that matter its Army is presently engaged in some such efforts. This struggle is now shaping into a threat to the whole Federation of Pakistan. The Government of Pakistan has only to blame itself for having failed to reform this area for last sixty years. If  we look at last sixty years history of this area we will find that the people of this area have made tremendous sacrifices for the people of Pakistan and in return what have they got is more poverty for the poor people and few individuals have become richer in the garb of Smugglers, Drug Barons or Criminal Gang Leaders. The common man has definitely not benefited from the present system. On the other hand if we look at the Government side it is a fact that the Government of Pakistan cannot discharge its International obligations under the present system. Hence it is in the interest of both i.e. the people of the area and the Government of Pakistan to look for ways to bring peace and democracy in the tribal areas of Pakistan. However it is here that the most vexing question arises that whether democracy is really compatible with the value system prevalent in tribal area where the gun culture is part of local traditions and where decisions are made through the barrel of gun. This is the question which needs to be debated in this forum.

The Present System in FATA
The present system in FATA is based on the then requirement of Imperial British to keep their Lines of Communications open through the tribal areas to Afghanistan for their colonial ambitions and at the same time dovetailing the requirement of the local tribes who wanted to keep their own system of administration based on their local traditions. This suited both the tribes and the Imperial British. The Imperial British with the consent of the tribes codified this into a system called the FCR. The Government of Pakistan has no extra territorial ambitions towards Afghanistan     therefore this system does not suit Pakistan’s national interests. The aims and objectives of Government of Pakistan should be to bring this area in to the mainstream of Pakistan and to develop this area  like the rest of Pakistan After all the tribal people are own people and we owe it to them to bring them in to the main stream. Dovetailing their requirements with our requirements should not be such an uphill task. We have simply wasted our time. We have simply been sleeping over this problem for last sixty years and now when this area has come in to World Focus we are running helter and skelter to change the system over night. Bringing Peace and Democracy in FATA is a long and overdue requirement but it can not be achieved over night.
 Desirability and Achievability of Desired Objective
There is no difference of opinion on the desirability of having peace and democracy in the tribal area because that is the only way forward in today’s world. However people do have reservations about the achievability of this objective in the present environments of FATA. Such people argue that Peace and Democracy basically are not compatible with a society which is based on gun culture. The basic structure and traditions of the area are based on use of force and threat of use of force and that these people are not prepared to change their traditions so where is the space for peace and democracy in such a society. These people further argue that democracy is always based on tolerance which they think is lacking in tribal areas. These people neglect to see that Pushtun society is individualist in nature and the hold of Maliks in this society is not as strong as the Waderas of Sind or Choudhrys of Punjab and Sardars of Baluchistan and the institutional hold of elders in this society would rather help in bringing peace and democratic values in the society rather than opposing it. The example of NWFP will falsify these presumptions. This Province was governed through the same FCR. People have the same cultural and ethnic background including the gun culture. Yet the province was ready for governance through a democratic system as early as 1920 but it was delayed till 1931 on such pretexts. The real motive was that the Congress Party that was dominating at the Central Scene was worried about the interests of small percentage of Hindus living in this province. Today we are faced with the same situation and vested interest groups and various mafias are frightening the government and preventing the government from introducing reforms that can bring peace and democracy to tribal areas.

The Way Forward
The only way forward to bring peace and prosperity to tribal areas is to introduce democracy in the tribal area. Of course this can not be done without working an alternative system of administration which incorporates the local traditions and at the same time has sufficient checks and balances and enforcement mechanism to implement a democratic dispensation. The tribes as per present agreement have acceded to the State of Pakistan and not to the Government of Pakistan because the system of Government of Pakistan is not acceptable to them. However if the Government of Pakistan works out a system of governance which incorporates their traditions like making the Jirga as part of their judicial system and evolves a policing system based on Levies and so on and so forth; arrangements which are acceptable to both the people and the government. It is thought there should be no difficulty in implementing it after obtaining the concurrence of the tribes either through a Grand Jirga or through a referendum. In fact the Government has worked out a complete package of reforms consisting of Structural Reforms, Administrative Reforms, Financial Reforms, Judicial Reforms and Reorganisation of Law Enforcement Agencies. Since there are mafias and vested interest groups therefore the Government would like to keep these reforms confidential till some time. The Government started implementing these reforms in a camouflaged manner and election of Agency Councillors was the first step. These vested interest groups torpedoed this effort and got the whole administration changed including the Governor. Beside these administrative measures the evolutionary process of our province from the status of Punjab Irregular Frontier Region in to an independent province will be both interesting and instructive for our study in this seminar. The great services of Sir Sahibzada Abdul Qayum are not to be lauded only but need to be studied also. His  insistence on making of Islamia College and for  ensuring the presence of Personality like Haji Sahib of Turangzai on foundation laying ceremony shows his focus and tact. We all know that education travels both through Islamia Colleges and along the Road Infrastructural. This is the key to change. However societal changes do not occur over nights. One needs to be patient and persevering. Change is inevitable and will take place.
To conclude, Gentlemen the pursuit of the goal of Role of peace and democracy in FATA is an ideal and achievable objective. In fact this may be the only way to bring peace and prosperity to this very highly under developed region and its people.

Jirga: An Exercise In Futility?

This Article appeared in DAWN on August 19, 2007

TO say that the situation in Afghanistan is grave would be an understatement. Every passing day sees the US becoming mired ever deeper in Afghanistan à la Iraq, because of its faulty strategy. In its desperation, it is looking for supporting planks and is leaning more and more on Pakistan. Thus the mantra of “do more”.

Meanwhile, Kabul, the proverbial capital of intrigues, is bustling with renewed activities. People are talking about a new great game related to the oil and gas reserves of the Central Asian Republics and trade opportunities that mask the ambitions of the US and the new emerging superpowers. It is in the backdrop of this environment that Pakistan is getting sucked into the situation in the name of the peace jirga.

This writer participated in the Pak Afghan Joint Peace Jirga in Kabul held from Aug 9 to Aug 12, 2007 with the aim of being useful, despite many people questioning the wisdom of such a jirga. Will the latter be able to achieve results or will it lead to Pakistan getting further sucked into a situation from which extrication would be difficult.

In its 60 years, Pakistan has suffered for 30 mainly because of the fallout from the situation inside Afghanistan. In this peace jirga, one saw the same old players with suspect loyalties and ambitions occupying front seats in new roles. They are the same Ustad Rabbani, Ustad Rasool Sayaf, Pir Sayyed Ahmad Gillani, Ismail Khan Toran, Rasheed Dostum and Pir Sayyed Mujadadi. Of course, the late Ahmad Shah Masud has been succeeded by Ameen Faheem and Younas Qanooni.

The main spokesman Abdullah Abdullah was co-chairing the jirga with Interior Minister Aftab Ahmad Khan Sherpao from Pakistan’s side. All the main Afghan speakers, well-prepared unlike their Pakistani counterparts, carried venom in their hearts against Pakistan ” in spite of the lip service paid to long historical linkages and the hospitality of the Pakistani people towards five million Afghan refugees.Afghanistan’s hostile attitude towards Pakistan since its inception is not a new phenomenon. The attacks on Pakistan’s embassy in Kabul and its consulates in Jalalabad on the slight pretext are well known and common.

Thus those who understand Pakistan-Afghan relations are justified in wondering as to who conceived this novel idea of the peace jirga and for what purpose. The men behind this are those who authored and brokered the infamous North Waziristan agreement.In an effort to sell the North Waziristan agreement, the role of the peace jirgas was overstated, and George Bush was prompt in observing that if these could resolve issues, why not have them between Pakistan and Afghanistan. We had to agree.

Pakistan realised the disastrous effects of the North Waziristan agreement after 10 months, after considerable damage to its writ and the resultant spread of the menace of Talibanisation to settled areas, right up to Islamabad.

Let us hope that our journey to this jirga does not land us into further trouble.

Talibanisation is an ideology and US operations in Afghanistan, instead of dealing with the threat posed by this ideology, are focused solely on getting hold of Osama Bin Laden, Ayman-al-Zawahiri, Mulla Omar etc. The stabilisation of society in Afghanistan does not seem to be high on their list of priorities. Thus the common man in Afghanistan, particularly in the Pashtun-dominated southern and eastern provinces, faces lack of security and the absence of service delivery.

The rank and file of the Taliban in Afghanistan is not only swelling but the effects of this phenomenon are spreading towards the adjoining tribal areas of Pakistan.

Owing to the Pakistani government’s inconsistent tribal policy that changes with the appointment of each new governor, the menace is spreading to the settled areas of Pakistan on hand and to the crossing of some Taliban into Afghanistan on the other, thus giving enough reason to Kabul to blame Pakistan for all its troubles.

Was the Pak Afghan Joint Peace Jirga beneficial to Pakistan? For an answer, it is imperative that the dynamics of the jirga system be clearly understood. The jirga is a formal forum to resolve issues in Pashtun tradition but it has certain prerequisites. First is the precise definition of the issue or issues that can be equated with terms of reference for the jirga.

Second is the nomination of the parties involved in the conflict and their willingness to submit to the jirga. This is known as wak or ikhtiar. These aspects were missing in this jirga.

The present issue is between Al Qaeda and the Taliban on the one side and the Afghan government and Nato forces on the other. Since neither side is willing to negotiate, one is at a loss to understand as to how a peace jirga between the people of the NWFP and Balochistan and the people of Afghanistan can resolve the issue, especially when the main contenders are not represented.

Whether non-state actors should be represented is an altogether different question. There are those who contend that this jirga would at least bring the two people together to get to know each other more. Do the people of the NWFP and Balochistan and the Afghans require further introduction?

Some nationalist elements in Balochistan and the NWFP and on the Afghan side question the validity of the Durand Line, the international border between Pakistan and Afghanistan. The government should be aware that such frequent meetings could give impetus to this dormant issue.

There are those who think that the new game is to “pretend” that there are issues between Afghanistan and Pakistan that need to be resolved. Such issues would subsequently be used as a pretext to involve Pakistan in the war in Afghanistan, thus paving the way for joint operations involving Pakistani territory.

All such theories need to be given due consideration by Pakistan before the government haphazardly peruses processes which have not been thought through.

As already mentioned, the Afghan side had prepared very well for this jirga, with the aim of putting the whole blame on Pakistan for the present situation in Afghanistan. They wanted the delegates from Pakistan to believe that all Taliban under Mulla Omar are Pakistanis or have been trained by Pakistan and are being financed and directed by it.

The speakers had been well selected and had prepared with proper speeches. On the Pakistan side, such preparations were hardly visible. The participants consisted of three main strands: nationalist parties like the ANP and Pashtun Khwa Milli Awami Party with their own ideologies, traders who wanted to establish/refresh links with their counterparts in Afghanistan, and simple tribesmen who did not know what to do and what to say.

It was said that the Afghan delegates had more than 60 meetings to prepare for this jirga. On Pakistan’s side, there were hardly any preparations. Everyone was on his own, creating an embarrassing situation for the Pakistani delegation despite some last-minute efforts by Mr Sherpao to bring some sanity to the proceedings.

To quote just one example, the Afghan side was so consistent in its efforts that Abdullah Abdullah, known for his anti-Pakistan stance, was monitoring the progress of each subcommittee personally.

The attorney-general of Afghanistan, with a full team of lawyers, was the member of the first committee which was to deal with the main issue of non-interference in each other’s internal affairs. This equated to allegations against Pakistan and the propaganda which the Afghan government carries out against it.

The proceedings of this committee started from 8am on Aug 11 and continued until 4am on Aug 12. The Pakistan side had no qualified person to draft the recommendations. The result was a diluted version of the recommendations which assumed the form of a trade agreement. These recommendations were never placed before the committee and were announced in the morning in a hurry.

The jirga also witnessed some ugly moments. At one point, the tribal leaders wanted to walk out and address a press conference on the plea that if the Pakistani delegation accepted the whole blame for the situation in Afghanistan, they would be the ones that would have to take action.

In fact, they would be required to stop cross-border incursions and that would mean the complete consent of their tribes which would be a tall order, particularly when they had not discussed the issue with them beforehand.

On another occasion, Hazrat Pir Sayyed Mujadadi, not satisfied with the venom that he had spewed against Pakistan from the rostrum in the main jirga hall, while leading the Friday prayers started talking against Pakistan in the khutba.

Some of the tribal elders from Pakistan stood up and refused to offer prayers behind him and forced him down from the pulpit.

In spite of all this, one must accept that the way the Afghan government and the people treated the guests from Pakistan was really praiseworthy. They had put in much effort to arrange accommodation, transportation and food, and their movements appeared to have been well coordinated and they remained very courteous in spite of provocations.

The British, after three costly wars, learnt that the best way to deal with Afghanistan was to leave it to its own fate and concentrate on controlling the borders between Afghanistan and the territories now representing Pakistan. This is the lesson available to the rulers of Pakistan. One wishes they would understand this plain logic. But then a wish is not a fish that one can fry and enjoy.

The writer is former secretary, home & tribal affairs, NWFP, and secretary Fata (Security).

Gathering Storm On The Western Frontier

This Article appeared in DAWN on March 11, 2007.

American intrusions into Pakistan from Afghanistan, which until now have been occasional, are about to become frequent territorial violations. These inroads, be they in the form of targeted missile/air strikes or “enter-operate-leave” incursions are a rapidly approaching reality. What this entails for Pakistan is worth some thoughts.

All signals emanating from American centres of influence indicate a perception that Pakistan lacks the will or capability or both to prevent militants based inside its territorial jurisdiction from aiding the Taliban in their attacks against US/Afghan troops in Afghanistan. The US and the Karzai government are failing in their stated mission and American domestic and international opinion requires a scapegoat to justify this protracted conflict. The most conveniently available scapegoat is Pakistan.

The US cannot afford escalation of hostilities and its troops being bogged down in Afghanistan. This would be disastrous for its global strategy in terms of prestige, authority and supremacy. It is poised to take direct action and seems to be contemplating a “spring offensive” of its own inside Pakistan.

The militants would welcome such an escalation. The more Americans enlarge their area of operations, the more they would expose themselves to militant attacks. If it becomes unbearable for the militants in FATA, they would shift their bases and operations down country to the NWFP, thereby drawing in more US-led counter-insurgency measures.

Already we are witnessing Talibanisation in most of the southern districts of the NWFP and even up north. If latest trends are anything to go by, the days to come would show deeper cooperation and coordination among pro-Taliban militants, pro-Kashmiri and other jihadi groups and sectarian outfits. The statistics and analyses of recent suicide attacks in Pakistan show that there has been some interaction amongst the groups. This, coupled with political unrest in Balochistan, would have more than a destabilising effect throughout the country.

The army in FATA cannot afford to assume the role of a silent spectator. With local public opinion being what it is, neither can it fight alongside American troops against its own people. Having entered the tribal belt and taken over administrative command for all practical purposes, it cannot simply pack up and leave. It has to show a modicum of success vis-à-vis its goals.

A way out from this gathering storm can be found based on a relevant analysis of how and why we have managed to land ourselves in this situation.

It seems that the army entered the tribal areas for the first time since independence without realising the intensity of the problem and, therefore, lacking any tangible short-, mid- or long-term plan. Its action at the time was meant to show the world that the government was serious about tackling terrorism.

The history of the area repeated itself. Every operation mired the military forces deeper into the quagmire that is Waziristan. With US pressure building and militants unrelenting, the army realised that the task was not simple. It, therefore, embarked on a simultaneous policy of negotiations with the tribal populace and the use of force, but with a disjointed approach.

There was complete lack of coordination and trust amongst those responsible for negotiations (political authorities), the users of force (military authorities) and those dealing with information (intelligence agencies). It was simply not realised that the use of force is always subservient and not parallel to the negotiation process. It frequently happened that while the political authorities were negotiating a deal, simultaneous military operations were taking place without the knowledge of the political authorities.

Military authorities acting against the advice of the political administration opted for negotiated settlements with militants through the clergy and retired army officers, bypassing the tribal elders. This was done at a time when in the public view the militants had the upper hand.

In the tribal belt, where perceptions carry more weight than reality, while the government was perceived to have negotiated a settlement from a position of weakness, the militants went about creating a parallel administration and eliminating pro-government tribal leaders (more than 100).

When such ill-conceived agreements (Wana and Baitullah Mehsud etc) unravelled, the military went for indiscriminate use of force in North Waziristan alienating the local population further. Daily attacks on government and military installations/personnel became the order of the day and parallel administration by the militants started functioning in North Waziristan too.

The government faced with the loss of writ in Waziristan opted for the North Waziristan peace agreement brokered by the new governor. This agreement gave de jure authentication to the de facto situation in the area, its basic flaw being that while the responsibilities assigned to the government were tangibly verifiable (dismantling of check posts, no operations etc), those assigned to militants were not (expulsion of foreigners, no cross border attacks etc).

The US/Afghans are perturbed and continue to tell Pakistan “to do more”. To pacify them and fearing direct American intervention the military either went for or owned up to the indiscriminate use of force in South Waziristan and Bajaur. The militants retaliated and the result was a spate of suicide attacks not only in FATA, but also in the NWFP and even in Islamabad.

The solution lies in revisiting both the Pak-US understanding on the extent of cooperation keeping in view the national ethos and peace agreements with the militants. The government should put in all its efforts to convince the Americans that although their mutual strategic understanding (anti-Taliban drive) would stay as it is in the individual interest of both countries, tactics to achieve this objective would differ. Each country, be it Pakistan, Afghanistan or the US, would have to devise and implement tactics keeping its own internal situation and national ethos in mind. Once the US elephant is off our backs, we can start handling the issue from the viewpoint of our own interest.

The tactics that Pakistan needs to curb pro-Taliban militancy must be based on the realisation that a fast-track approach under US pressure won’t work. The militancy problem is a complex multi-dimensional issue dating back nearly four decades to the US-sponsored jihad against the Soviets in Afghanistan. Any long-term solution would need to take into account this factor in conjunction with the dynamics of the area and its people.

Foremost would be winning over FATA again by ensuring that that the people see tangible benefits in the desired objective. Our policies in the area should be devised and adapted to the goal of what the Americans term as “winning hearts and minds”. This would require a delicate balancing act aiming at giving a stake to the people without weakening the current administrative system in FATA in the short- and mid-term.

Having extended adult franchise to the people of FATA in 1997 thereby diluting the hold of the tribal maliks, it is unrealistic to expect the same elders to have a hold over the people of their respective tribes vis-à-vis implementing government policies. Neither would it be wise to extend the civil/criminal procedural laws of the settled areas to FATA because the working of our courts, police and patwar systems are nothing to be proud of.

In this scenario what needs to be done can only be mentioned briefly here.

1. Relevant provisions of FCR be made appealable to a special bench of the high court constituted for the purpose.

2. Political parties be allowed to operate in FATA to counter the ideological thrust of pro-Taliban elements.

3. In order to ensure that only those maliks who have confidence of their respective tribes are assigned responsibilities, the institution of malak be made elected. An elected judicial jirga and an elected development jirga would be formed of such maliks. Elections to these bodies would be for a period of two years on the basis of adult franchise while distribution of seats would be according to “nikaat” (system of inter/intra tribal shares). The political agent would have the prerogative to distribute the quantum of funds amongst the tribes keeping in view their level of cooperation with the government. Funds utilisation once assigned to a particular tribe would be the prerogative of the development jirga. This would give internal autonomy and a participatory role to the elected people at the micro level and keep a leverage of the administration over the tribes at the macro level.

4. Levies as opposed to khasadars be raised in the Waziristans, thereby not only generating employment but also creating a disciplined force with roots amongst the tribes.

5. Operationally countering current militant tactics (especially the suicide bombers) is mainly the domain of intelligence agencies. Their efforts need to be coordinated at the field level with them giving real time information to the political authorities to devise plans.

6. A system of regional coordination between the tribal belt and adjacent settled districts needs to be put in place as both these areas have interlinked issues. At present, no such linkage is available between their respective law enforcement and intelligence networks. Previously, the regional commissioners and home secretaries performed this role.

7. Its time the main clauses of the North Waziristan peace agreement were revisited with the consent of the people. Checkposts to be manned jointly by the military, paramilitary and tribal representatives should be re-established at crucial points. The army has to take a backseat, while giving effective back-up to the political authorities as and when required. The use of force and cordon and search operations under the political authorities and tribal elders may not achieve the desired results in one go, but would keep the militants on the run.

8. The most effective check against the setting up of parallel administrations is service delivery by the government in terms of justice, fair play, development, security and giving a sense of identification, ownership and tangible benefits to the people. Government representatives need to reach out to the people on these terms.

Any strategic idea needs deliberate and diligent tactical implementation based on conviction, motivation and drive of the man behind the gun. Halfhearted measures by self-serving people would not do in these crucial times.