This Article appeared in Daily Dawn on April 26th, 2010.

INDIA has been toying with the idea of the Cold Start strategy for the past six years. It started validating the concept through various military exercises, including Divya Astra (divine weapon) in March 2004, Vijra Shakti (thunder power) in May 2005, Desert Strike in Nov-Dec 2005, Sang-i-Shakti (joint power) from March to May 2006, Shatrunash in May 2007 and Ashwamedh (valour and intellectual illumination) from January to May 2007.

With the nuclear shadow hanging over India and Pakistan and the location of Pakistan’s core areas along the border, there is no room for conventional war between the two countries. Yet Indian military thinkers are bent upon convincing their political leadership that this space for conventional war exists and that they can achieve it through the Cold Start strategy without provoking a nuclear response from Pakistan. Through this concept, they are trying to justify new infrastructural development for forward cantonments.

Essentially the concept is that unlike a conventional war where a country mobilises first and then goes to war, here you attack first and mobilise later. It is a dangerous concept and amounts to playing with fire.

Once Indian armed forces cross the international border into Pakistan’s territory, why should the latter’s armed forces not respond? India could be thinking in terms of a limited war and electing not to defend the ‘lodgement’ made in Pakistan’s territory in order not to escalate the situation, a la the Kargil situation where Pakistan did not own the lodgement or defend it with its air force.

That situation left the Indian army free to deal with it as it chose. India can now choose to make the same mistake. But it is with such a situation in mind that exercise Azm-i-Nau3 appears to have been conceived — a portion of the armed forces as a combined armed team supported by the Pakistan air force deals with a lodgement made by the Indian army under the Cold Start concept.

During the exercise, it was heartening to note the capabilities and technologies added to Pakistan’s army and air force. It was an excellent demonstration of fire power, watched as it was by the country’s prime minister, parliamentarians, members of the defence committee, retired army chiefs, the military and defence attachés of other countries and the national and international media — although some people questioned the media coverage and the message that was intended to be conveyed.

Cold Start has been under study over the past year through a number of war games. One conclusion the Pakistan Army would have reached is that India would probably be required to mount an extra manoeuvre to justify a war against Pakistan.

Some people in both countries are involved in an India-Pakistan peace initiative, which is commendable. Yet the mindset of the Indian political leadership is well-known: the country is placing conditions even for restarting the composite dialogue. And, notwithstanding the compulsions faced by the India political leadership, it is also essential to read their military’s thinking.

Peace between the two countries cannot be a one-sided affair. The public and international communities need to understand the dilemma faced by Pakistan in the face of Indian intransigence. Pakistan’s armed forces are involved on the country’s western front in context of the war on terror, while India continues to pose a threat along the eastern borders.

Pakistan cannot afford to ignore these threats. The concept of Azm-i-Nau3 hinges on the condition that India keeps the incursion limited — but this is doubtful. If India does not keep the incursion limited, which is more likely, the situation may well spiral out of control.

Pakistan has no option other than that of the idea of first use in its nuclear doctrine. Yet despite this compulsion, Pakistan has chosen not to adopt a ‘push button’ concept such as that opted for by the US, whose president is always accompanied by a briefcase containing push buttons and codes. Instead, Pakistan has chosen a ‘force in being’ concept, expecting that it will have sufficient time to upgrade its state of preparedness.

In view of the risk inherent in the Cold Start strategy, India must understand that while there is no harm in dreaming, actions in this context can have dangerous results.

The writer is a retired brigadier, former secretary Fata and home secretary NWFP.
mahmoodshah@mahmoodshah.com